meeting the "more likely than not" standard.
On the other hand, habeas petitioners with truly persuasive evidence of innocence would seem constitutionally entitled to habeas review if the Constitution prohibits the execution of innocent people. This Note does not argue whether actual innocence should be considered a bona fide constitutional claim. Because Schlup presented truly persuasive evidence of innocence, this Note argues that the Court should have answered the question of whether the execution of an innocent person is unconstitutional. The clear implication of the Court's silence on this issue is that the Constitution provides no such protection. Thus, it appears that mere evidence of innocence does not entitle an actually innocent prisoner to habeas review. II . BACKGROUND The writ of habeas corpus 5 is the exclusive federal remedy available to a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks as relief a speedier or immediate release. 6 However, federal habeas courts are not free to entertain the claims of every state prisoner who petitions for the writ. For federal jurisdiction to apply, a state prisoner's habeas petition must contain a cognizable issue for review, and must satisfy certain procedural prerequisites. 7 Evidence that a habeas petitioner is either legally 8 or factually innocent 9 of the crime for which he was convicted may be relevant in determining whether his petition satisfies both requirements.
A.
COGNIZABLE ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Violations of Constitutional Rights
Federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain a state prisoner's petition for habeas corpus relief where confinement violates the prisoner's constitutional rights. 1 0 Although it is unclear whether factual innocence of a crime by, itself can present a. constitutional basis for habeas relief, innocence is not wholly irrelevant. First, because several constitutional provisions protect the innocent from unjust conviction and sentencing, a habeas petitioner who is factually innocent, but who was found guilty at a state proceeding, may have grounds to assert that a constitutional deprivation occurred at his trial. For example, conviction of a factually innocent person may have occurred because trial counsel was ineffective. Because the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution" guarantees a right to the "effective assistance of counsel,"' 2 such a petitioner would have a cognizable issue for habeas relief.
Conviction Despite Inadequate Evidence-"Legal Innocence" as a Constitutional Claim UnderJackson v. Virginia
Besides relying on specific procedural guarantees, a factually innocent habeas petitioner may also establish a cognizable issue for review based on the Fourteenth Amendment's general guarantee of due process. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause as embodying the evidentiary standard of proof that the Constitution requires in criminal cases-w"proof beyond a reasonable doubt." s 3
Therefore, a habeas petitioner effectively alleges a violation of his constitutional rights (and presents a cognizable issue for habeas review) when claiming that evidence adduced at trial did not prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' 4 In Jackson v. Virginia, 15 the Court articulated a "rationality" standard to govern habeas court review of cases where petitioners claim imprisonment based on constitutionally inadequate evidence. Under the Jackson rationality standard, habeas courts should ask "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found ... [guilt] beyond a reasonable doubt." 16 In explaining the proper application of this standard, the Jackson Court held that habeas courts should consider only record evidence. 17 The inquiry that a habeas court makes when applying the Jackson rationality standard is therefore not whether the petitioner is in fact innocent of the crime for which he has been convicted. Rather, the Jackson inquiry is limited to the narrower issue of whether a prisoner's confinement was based on legally sufficient evidence of guilt. That is, whether the prisoner is legally innocent. 18 
Conviction and Death Sentence Despite Actual Innocence-"Factual
Innocence" Under Herrera v. Collins
The Jackson Court did not answer the question of whether a persuasive claim of factual innocence, as opposed to legal innocence, could present a cognizable issue for habeas review. Whether this kind of actual innocence claim could, by itself, present a cognizable issue for habeas review depends on whether or not it is unconstitutional to imprison (and even execute) someone who is factually innocent but whose trial was otherwise free of constitutional error. In the 1993 case of Herrera v. Collins,' 9 the Supreme Court intimated, but declined to hold, that the imprisonment or execution of a factually innocent person does indeed violate the Constitution.
In Herrera, Leonel Herrera invoked both the Eighth 20 and the Fourteenth Amendments 2 ' to support his claim that his imprisonment and death sentence violated the Constitution and therefore presented a cognizable issue for habeas review. 22 Leonel Herrera claimed that his deceased brother, Raul Herrera, Sr., had committed the murders of the two police officers for which he (Leonel) was under sentence of death. 2 3 To support his claim, Leonel Herrera relied not on allegations of error at trial, but on new evidence in the form of affidavits that he procured only after exhausting state court remedies.
Although the Supreme Court ruled against Herrera, the Court did not completely dismiss the contention that the Constitution bars the execution of factually innocent people. Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, chose to "assume, for the sake of argument... that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional." 25 ChiefJustice Rehnquist did not articulate an evidentiary test for such constitutional claims. Instead, Rehnquist merely stated that a habeas petitioner would have to meet an "extraordinarily high" threshold before receiving a full habeas hearing on the claim of innocence. Without articulating the standard he was applying, Chief Justice Rehnquist nonetheless concluded that the affidavits attesting to Leonel Herrera's innocence did not present a sufficiently persuasive case. 27 In reaching that conclusion, the ChiefJustice emphasized the weaknesses in Herrera's affidavits. For example, Rehnquist noted that the affidavits contradicted one another, 28 and that there was no explanation for why statements by supporting affiants came ten years after the murders had been committed. 2 9 ChiefJustice Rehnquist also emphasized the strength of the proof of Leonel Herrera's guilt that was adduced at trial. 3°A lthough Chief Justice Rehnquist would not express an opinion as to whether there is a constitutional prohibition against the execution of a person who has made a persuasive showing of actual innocence (discussing the purported prohibition only arguendo), six justices-three dissenting arid three concurring-concluded that such a prohibition exists. The three dissenting justices 3 ; id. at 875 (White, J., concurring). For example, when the police arrested Herrera, human blood (of the type of one of the murdered officers) was splattered throughout Herrera's car and on his jeans. Id. at 857. Moreover, evidence at trial indicated that when Leonel Herrera was arrested, he was in possession of a handwritten note in which he confessed and offered to turn himself in. Id. at 857 n.1.
31 Justice Blackmun authored a dissent that was joined byJustices Stevens and Souter. Id. at 876 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
ple. 3 2 Three concurring justices 33 also concluded that the Constitution bars the execution of innocent people. 34 Yet these concurring justices believed that the Court properly sidestepped the issue because in this specific case Leonel Herrera failed to present a persuasive showing of actual innocence. 35 Thus, after Herrera, it appeared that if a petitioner could make a showing of innocence sufficiently stronger than did Leonel Herrera, a majority of the Court would hold that the Constitution bars the execution of the innocent. 36 However, several justices questioned whether the Court would ever again need to entertain the issue of whether the Constitution prohibits the execution of a habeas petitioner who makes a persuasive showing of factual innocence. First, the majority opinion stressed the ways in which the innocent have been historically protected through the Constitution's guarantees of fair procedure and the safeguards of clemency and pardon. 3 7 Given these protections, Justice Scalia, in concurrence, concluded that "it is improbable that evidence of innocence as convincing as [Herrera's]" would ever again arise in a petition for the federal writ of habeas corpus. 38 In seeming agreement, Justice O'Connor concluded in her concurring opinion that the ques- 32 Id. at 882 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices also argued that the Court should have articulated the precise burden of proof that should govern constitutional claims of actual innocence when presented in a petition for the federal writ of habeas corpus. Under the dissent's formulation, a habeas petitioner could obtain relief on a claim of actual innocence upon a showing that he is "probably innocent." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
33 Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion that was joined byJustice Kennedy. Id. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice White wrote his own concurring opinion. Id. at 875 (White, J., concurring). And Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurring opinion that was joined by Justice Thomas. Id. at 874 (Scalia, J., concurring). 34 See id. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I cannot disagree with the fundamental legal principle that executing the innocent is inconsistent with the Constitution"); id. at 875 (White, J., concurring) ("I assume that a persuasive showing of 'actual innocence' made after trial... would render unconstitutional the execution of the petitioner in this case"). But see id. at 874-75 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("there is no basis in text, tradition, or even contemporary practice.., for finding in the Constitution a right to demand judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence of innocence brought forward after conviction"). 35 See id. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[p]etitioner is not innocent, in any sense of the word"); id. at 875 (White, J., concurring) ("[f] or the reasons stated in the Court's opinion, petitioner's showing falls far short.., and I therefore concur in thejudgment."). But see id. at 875 (Scalia, J., concurring) (concurring only because "there is no legal error in deciding a case by assuming arguendo that an asserted constitutional right exists"). ion of whether federal habeas courts may entertain convincing claims of actual innocence "may never require resolution at all."3 9
Because evidence of factual innocence may not present grounds for habeas relief, a state prisoner who claims to be innocent may need to rely on independent constitutional grounds for habeas relief. However, even if a state prisoner has viable, independent constitutional grounds to assert in a petition for habeas corpus, he will not be entifled to habeas relief unless certain procedural prerequisites are met B.
PROCEDURALLY BARRED HABEAS CLAIMS Several types of procedurally defaulted claims are not entitled to federal habeas review. For example, before a state prisoner can raise a claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, he must exhaust state remedies. 40 If the exhaustion requirement is not met, a "procedural bar" precludes federal habeas court review. 4 1 Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b), a procedural bar also applies to "successive" petitions where a state prisoner raises grounds that are identical to grounds heard and decided in previous habeas petitions. 42 Moreover, under § 2244(b), even if a subsequent petition alleges new and different grounds, a district court may nonetheless dismiss the petition if the state prisoner "deliberately withheld" a claim from an earlier petition or if the petitioner "otherwise abused the writ" (an "abusive" petition) .43
39 Id. at 874 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 4o "An application for the writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the Courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1994) .
41 This exhaustion requirement is generally satisfied when the highest state court is afforded a fair opportunity to rule on the factual and theoretical substance of a claim. See genera!!y Hartston & Gonzalez, supra note 7, at 1404.
42 Section 2244(b) providesWhen after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual issue, or after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person in custody pursuant to thejudgment of a State court has been denied by a court of the United States or a justice or judge of the United States release from custody or other remedy on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of such person need not be entertained by a court of the United States of ajustice orjudge of the United States unless the application alleges and is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier application for the writ, and unless the courtjustice, or judge is satisfied that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1995). 43 Id.
Cause and Prejudice
Procedural bars do not apply in cases where a habeas petitioner can show both "cause" for his procedural default as well as actual "prejudice" attributable to his inability to comply with procedural requirements. 44 For example, a habeas court may view a state prisoner's claims of innocence as procedurally barred if the prisoner failed to raise his claims before a state court. But, such a petitioner could show cause for his procedural default if, for example, the state failed to disclose critical exculpatory evidence thus rendering "procedural compliance impracticable. ' 45 A federal habeas court could then review this procedurally barred habeas petition if, along with cause, prejudice also resulted. Prejudice is established where the petitioner can demonstrate "a reasonable probability that" if the fact finder would have had the exculpatory evidence, he "would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt." 4 6
The Miscarriage ofJustice Exception
Although a showing of cause and prejudice is generally required before a habeas court will hear an otherwise procedurally barred habeas petition, the Supreme Court has construed § 2244 to allow consideration of procedurally barred successive or abusive claims (even absent cause and prejudice) where the "ends of justice" demand. 4 7 The Court has expressly tied the triggering of this "ends of justice" exception to evidence of innocence, requiring habeas petitioners to supplement their claims with a "colorable showing of factual innocence." 48 Because the exception is intended to prevent the execution of innocent people-the "quintessential miscarriage of justice" 49 -it is often referred to as the "miscarriage of justice" exception. 50 In this context, the Court has made it clear that actual innocence is "not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." Under this standard, cause can be demonstrated by showing that the "factual or legal basis of a claim was not reasonably available to counsel," or that governmental interference rendered procedural compliance "impracticable." Id. 
The Evolution of the Miscarriage ofJustice Exception
At common law, res judicata did not attach to a court's denial of habeas relief.
5 2 Thus, when a court would deny a habeas petition, the petitioner could then turn around and make "a renewed application ... to every other judge or court in the realm. '5 3 The common law then bound each court or judge so petitioned "to consider the question of the prisoner's right to discharge independently, and [was] not to be influenced by the previous decisions refusing discharge." 54 The rule arguably "made sense," because at common law an order denying habeas relief was not reviewable.
55
Once appellate review became available, however, the Supreme Court began to modify the common law rule that required courts to consider repetitive habeas petitions without regard to previous court holdings on individual petitioners' cases. In the 1924 companion cases of Salinger v. LoiseP 6 and WongDoo v. United States, 57 the Supreme Court recognized that, although resjudicata does not apply to "a decision on habeas corpus refusing to discharge a prisoner, s 5 8 second and subsequent habeas petitions should nonetheless be "disposed of in the exercise of sound judicial discretion." 59 Thus, after Salinger and Wong Doo, habeas courts could dismiss any successive or abusive habeas petitions because they had the discretion to consider not only previous 63 In breaking from the law as expressed in Salinger and Wong Doo, Sanders held that under § 2244, habeas courts not only had the power, but "the duty" to reach the merits of successive or abusive habeas petitions wherever "the ends of justice demand [ed] . " 64 Three years after Sanders, Congress amended § 2244 to "introduc[e] a greater degree of finality of judgments in habeas corpus proceedings. '65 The amendment broke the habeas corpus statute into subparagraphs. Subparagraph (a) remained unchanged except that it now applied only to federal prisoners. 66 As to repetitive appli-60 In Salinger, the Court expressly held that among the matters that "may be considered, and even given controlling weight, are (a) the existence of another remedy, such as a right in ordinary course to an appellate review" (i.e. an unexhausted claim) and (b) another habeas court's "prior refusal to discharge on like application." (i.e. a successive claim). Id. Then in Wong Doo, the Court held that a habeas court properly dismissed a claim where the petitioner "had full opportunity to offer proof [ No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to ajudgment of a court of the United States, or of any State, if it appears that the legality of such detention has been determined by ajudge or court of the United States on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition presents no new ground not theretofore presented and determined, and the judge or court is satisfied that the ends ofjustice will not be served by such inquiry.
28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1964 A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(b) (1994). 66 28 U.S.C § 2244(a) (1995).
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cations by state prisoners, Congress added subparagraph (b).67 Section 2244(b) states that a federal court "need not entertain" a second or subsequent habeas petition "unless" it is neither successive nor abusive. 68 But, unlike § 2244(a) (and the old version of §2244), § 2244(b) now contains no reference to "the ends ofjustice." 69 After Congress adopted the amended version of § 2244, the courts struggled to define how evidence of innocence should fit in with habeas court discretion over successive, abusive, or otherwise procedurally defaulted claims. The Supreme Court first construed the amended version of § 2244 in Kuhlmann v. Wilson.7 0 In Kuhlmann, a plurality of the Court provided federal habeas courts with "guidance for determining when to exercise the limited discretion granted them by § 2244(b)."71 In doing so, the plurality announced that it would "continue to rely on the reference in Sanders to the 'ends ofjustice,"' although § 2244(b) no longer contained this language. 
Open Issues Before Schlup v. Delo
In Kuhlmann, a plurality confirmed the continued viability of the ends ofjustice exception where a habeas petitioner presented a procedurally barred successive petition. There, the Court stated that to secure habeas review, a petitioner must establish "by a fair probability" that "the trier of facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt about... guilt." 7 3 After Kuhlmann, however, the Court articulated a variety of innocence standards. Thus, prior to Schiup, it was unclear as to what requisite showing of factual innocence a petitioner would need to make to secure a full habeas hearing.
For example, in Murray v. Carrier, a prisoner who was not under sentence of death presented a procedurally barred abusive petition. 74 Though decided on the same day as Kuhlmann, a majority of the Carrier Court seemingly refined the Kuhlmann articulation of the miscarriage ofjustice exception. Carrier stated, in dicta, that the miscarriage ofjustice exception applies where a petitioner can demonstrate that a "constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. 79 the Court explained that its decision in Kuhlmann "required federal courts to entertain successive petitions" where a petitioner presents evidence that meets the requirements of the miscarriage ofjustice exception. 8 0 The choice of the word "require" may indicate that habeas courts have an affirmative duty to hear a petitioner's habeas claim once the miscarriage ofjustice exception is triggered. Other Supreme Court statements, however, suggest otherwise. For example, in McCleskey the Court also stated that a procedural bar to a habeas petitioner's successive claim "may nonetheless be excused if he or she can show that a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice would result." 8 ' The use of the word "may" seems to support the proposition that once a habeas petitioner triggers the miscarriage of justice exception, a habeas court, at its discretion, may or may not grant a full hearing.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 3, 1984, Arthur Dade, an inmate of the Missouri State Penitentiary, was stabbed to death in a high security area of the prison. 82 Prison guards arrested Lloyd E. Schiup, Jr. in the prison dinclaimed "probably has caused the conviction of one innocent of the crime"). ing room shortly after the murder took place. 83 Although there was no physical evidence that connected Schlup to Dade's murder, the state won a guilty verdict by relying principally on testimony from two corrections officers who purportedly witnessed the killing. 93 The first such testimony was that of Sergeant Roger Flowers. Flowers was on duty on "Walk 1"9 4 and "Walk 2" 95 of the penitentiary at the time of the murder. 9 To counter the officers' testimony, Schlup relied on a videotape from a surveillance camera located in the prison dining room, two floors and several hundred feet from the scene of the crime.' 0 6 The videotape showed that Schlup was the first of several inmates to get in the dining room's lunch line. The videotape also showed that approximately one minute and five seconds after Schlup entered the dining room, several guards ran out of the room in apparent response to a distress call. Twenty-six seconds later, the tape shows O'Neal (one of Dade's killers) running into the dining room dripping with blood. 0 7 O'Neal was followed by another inmate, Randy Jordan, whose name was never mentioned at trial.' 0 8
In light of the videotape evidence, the timing of the sequence of 97 Id. at 855. 98 Id. 99 Id.
Id.
101 Maylee was unavailable to testify at Schlup's trial, but testimony from his pretrial deposition was admitted in evidence and read to the jury. Id. at 854-55 n.1. Although neither the State nor Schlup was able to establish the exact time of either Dade's murder or the radio distress call, the State did present evidence indicating that there had in fact been a lag in time between the two. For example, Flowers testified that upon witnessing the stabbing, he did not report the incident, but instead proceeded to engage in a struggle with Dade's assailant, Stewart, over the course of "a couple [of] minutes." 113 According to Flowers, he did not report the incident until after he had apprehended Stewart and brought him downstairs where he then informed Captain James Eberle that there had been a "disturbance." 1 4 Moreover, Eberle testified that he did not radio 1 5 for help until "approximately a minute" from the time when he first saw Flowers." 6 In light of the State's evidence, the jury found Schlup guilty and sentenced him to death. 117 The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed Schlup's conviction and death sentence," 8 and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari." 9 After exhausting his state collateral remedies, 120 Schlup filed a pro se petition for a federal writ of 109 Two inmates testified that they were behind Schlup on the way to the dining room and that they all walked at a leisurely pace. Id. at 856 n.10. 130 The court concluded that: 1) Schlup's trial counsel had reviewed statements that Schlup's potential witnesses had given to prison investigators, and 2) the testimony of those witnesses would be "repetitive of the testimony to be presented at trial." Id. at 639. But see id. at 642 (Heaney, J., dissenting) ("I disagree with the court's conclusion that Schlup was not prejudiced by his counsel's ineffectiveness during the penalty phase."). On March 11, 1992, Schlup, who was represented by new counsel, filed a second federal habeas corpus petition. This second petition included claims that 1) Schlup was actually innocent of Dade's murder; 2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview alibi witnesses; and 3) the State had failed to disclose critical exculpatory evidence. 1 3 3 Attached to the State's response were transcripts of inmate interviews that had been conducted shortly after the murder. According to the report, Flowers told Green to call for help, and Green notified the base shortly after the disturbance surrounding the attack on Dade began.' 3 7
Schlup immediately filed a traverse that claimed Green's interview statements conclusively proved Schlup's innocence; because Green's warning call came shortly after the incident began, Schlup would not have had time to both participate in the murder and reach the dining room a full minute and five seconds ahead of Green's distress call.138 Nonetheless, the district court dismissed Schlup's second habeas petition, 13 9 concluding that Schlup's claim of actual innocence did not amount to a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" under the "clear and convincing" standard of Sawyer v. Whitley.' 40 In his motion to set aside the dismissal, Schlup included an affidavit from Green that confirmed and expanded upon his post-incident statement.' 4 ' In the affidavit, Green swore that Flowers had instructed him to report the attack on Dade during the attack: "[Flowers] was on his way to break up the fight when he told me to call base." 142 Green also swore that after receiving Flowers' instruction he had in fact made a prompt call for assistance: "I immediately went into the office, picked up the phone, and called base."" 4 3 Moreover, Green identified Jordan, not Schlup, as the third assailant" 44 In spite (Heaney, J., dissenting) (quoting Pierce Aff., at 1 (Apr. 21, 1993)) ("I saw two white guys go onto 1-walk. One of them threw a cup of liquid into Arthur Dade's face, and the other one stabbed him. Lloyd Schlup was not involved in the stabbing.").
Moreover, Schlup also obtained, and the court considered, an affidavit that substantiated his videotape alibi (that he was in the dining room at the time of the murder). Id. at 742-43. This affidavit came from Robert Faherty, a prison lieutenant who Schlup had passed on his way to lunch on the day of the murder. Faherty's affidavit stated that before lunch, Schlup was in Faherty's presence for two and a half minutes to three minutes, and, that during that time, Schlup "was not perspiring or breathing hard, and... was not nervous." Id. at 748-49 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (quoting Faherty Aft., 1 4, at 6 (Oct. 26, 1993)). 147 Judge Heaney dissented because he viewed the affidavits of eyewitnesses to Dade's murder, as well as the affidavits that substantiated Schlup's videotape alibi, as "truly persuasive" evidence that Schlup is actually innocent. Id. at 744 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 148 The court of appeals initially denied Schlup 55 Because ChiefJudge Arnold thought that it was likely that Schlup's evidence of innocence would be "substantially more persuasive than Herrera's," he argued that the court of appeals should have remanded Schlup's case for a full evidentiary hearing on the constitutional claim of actual innocence.
56
. Although the court of appeals declined to consider Chief Judge Arnold's concerns, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 57 The Court's grant of certiorari was limited, however, to the question of what evidentiary standard governs the miscarriage of justice inquiry where a state prisoner claims actual innocence of the" crime (for which he was sentenced to death) in order to procure a full habeas review of his independent constitutional claims. Though also included in Schlup innocence asserted in Herrera as "novel" and "substantive."' 6 1 In contrast, the Court construed Schlup's claim of innocence as "procedural." 162 To illustrate this distinction, Justice Stevens characterized Schlup's habeas petition as grounded not in his contention of innocence, but instead as dependent upon his independent constitutional claims that his trial counsel had been ineffective and that the prosecution improperly withheld evidence. 163 ThusJustice Stevens construed Schlup's claim of innocence as "not itself a constitutional claim."' 6 4
Having held Herrera inapplicable, Justice Stevens then went on to discuss the availability of habeas court review of Schlup's independent constitutional claims. Justice Stevens noted that Schlup supported his' second habeas petition with evidence that he did not present in his first petition.
1 65 Accepting the argument that Schlup failed to establish "cause and prejudice" sufficient to excuse this procedural default, Justice Stevens explained that a procedural bar precluded the availability of habeas review.' 6 6 ThusJustice Stevens concluded that Schlup could obtain habeas review of his independent constitutional claims "only if he falls within the 'narrow class of cases . . .implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice."1 67 Accordingly, Justice Stevens construed Schlup's claim of innocence as potentially relevant only as a means by which Schlup could trigger the miscarriage of justice exception.168 Justice Stevens then proceeded to review the evolution of the miscarriage of justice exception. Justice Stevens acknowledged that the need to control burdens on federal courts led to both congressional and judicial action, 69 and that the net result of such action had been a "qualified application of the doctrine of resjudicata."' 7 0 Justice Stevens explained that the Court has never required the strict application of the rules of res judicata because "habeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable remedy." 17 1 Thus, Justice Stevens held that an inquiry into the equitable nature of a successive petitioner's habeas claim is required to satisfy "the ends ofjustice."' 1 72 And, according to Justice Ste- As to the standard of proof that should govern such claims, Justice Stevens distinguished the applicability of the Sawyer "clear and convincing 174 standard from the Carrier "probably resulted"' 75 stan-, dard. Specifically, Justice Stevens noted that in Sawyer, the habeas petitioner's claim challenged only the imposition of the death penalty, not guilt of the crime itself.' 76 Because Schlup argued that he was actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, Stevens concluded that the Carrier "probably resulted" standard-and not the Sawyer "clear and convincing" standard-applied in this case. 177 Justice Stevens supported this conclusion by presenting Carrier as a "less exacting standard" 178 that best accommodates the competing interests posed by successive claims of actual innocence; societal interests in "finality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial resources" 17 9 on the one hand, and "individual interests injustice" 8 0 on the other.
Justice 142, 145 (1970) ) ("the one thing almost never suggested on collateral attack is that the prisoner was innocent of the crime").
180 As to individual interests, Justice Stevens recognized that the "quintessential miscarriage ofjustice is the execution of a person who is actually innocent." Id. at 866 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court held that a habeas petitioner alleging a "fundamental miscarriage ofjustice" is entitled to a "somewhat less exacting standard of proof" than is a habeas petitioner "alleging that his sentence is too severe." Id.
dard requires a habeas petitioner to show that he is actually innocent, the Court held that to demonstrate actual innocence a petitioner "must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him." 18 ' Because this standard is made by reference to the likely behavior of jurors, Justice Stevens acknowledged that it was somewhat similar to the Jackson v. Virginia rationality standard of review for the sufficiency of record evidence. 182 However, Justice Stevens responded to Justice Rehnquist's dissenting arguments by noting points of distinction between the majority's "more likely than not" gateway standard, and the rationality standard of Jackson. First, Justice Stevens pointed out that the scope of review of the Court's instant gateway standard was broader than that recognized under the Jackson rationality standard.'1 8 3 Second, Justice Stevens noted that the use of the word "could" in the Jackson standard focused the inquiry on whether the trier of fact would have the power or ability to find guilt. 184 Justice Stevens argued that the use of the word "would" in the Court's gateway standard focused the inquiry instead on how the trier of fact was likely to behave. (1979) .
183 See Schlup 115 S. Ct. at 867-68. Justice Stevens explained that because the "Carrier standard is intended to focus the inquiry on actual innocence," district courts are "not bound by the rules of admissibility that would govern at trial" when entertaining gateway claims of actual innocence. Id. at 867. Thus, unlike the Jackson inquiry, where the reviewingjudge resolves all credibility issues in favor of the state, seeJackson, 443 U.S. at 319, when applying the majority's gateway standard, the judge must consider the credibility of the State's evidence. See Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 868. 184 Id. 185 Id. Thus,Justice Stevens explained that the phrase "more likely than not," as applied to gateway claims of actual innocence, is not satisfied where the district court believes that reasonable doubt exists. Rather, "the standard requires the district court to make a probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do." Id. 186 Id. at 869. Justice Stevens also noted that the courts below failed to consider the credibility of Schlup's newly discovered evidence; thus, the courts below misapplied the Sawyer standard. Accordingly, the decisions below were reversible no matter which standard was appropriate, making the Court's "more likely than not" articulation of the Carer standard arguably pure dictum. PoL'v 889, 903 n.52 (1995) . 187 Schlup, 115 S.Ct. at 869. After reviewing Schlup's evidence of innocence on remand, the district court held that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
B. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRENCE
Although Justice O'Connor joined in the majority opinion, she wrote separately to address the concerns raised by the dissent.' 8 8 Turning to Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion,' 8 9 Justice O'Connor acknowledged that while the majority's standard "focuses the inquiry on the likely behavior ofjurors,"' 9 0 the threshold standard for actual innocence is "substantially different" from the rationality standard of Jackson v. Virginia.' 9 ' Jackson, Justice O'Connor argued, can not apply here because that case established the standard of review for the sufficiency of record evidence; thus, it would appear "illsuited as a burden of proof."' 92 Next, in addressing Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion, 193 Justice O'Connor explained that in this case, "the Court does not, and need not decide whether the fundamental miscarriage ofjustice exception is a discretionary remedy."' 94 Rather, the Court merely determined that the court below committed legal error by relying on Sawyer instead of Carrier. 95 Because it is a "paradigmatic abuse of discretion for a court to base its judgment on an erroneous view of the law," Justice O'Connor explained that the Court's reversal of the lower court's judgment does not "disturb the traditional discretion of the district courts in this area." 9 6
C. CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S DISSENT
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist' 9 7 acknowledged that the Court had never before confronted the issue of what evidentiary standard a capital prisoner claiming innocence of a crime must meet to secure a full hearing before a habeas court. 98 However, ChiefJustice Rehnquist did not agree with the majority's conclusions in this case. 19 9 First, the Chief Justice argued that although the Sawyer Court arconvicted [Schlup] ticulated its "clear and convincing" standard where a habeas petitioner challenged his death sentence, habeas courts should nonetheless apply the Sawyer standard even where a capital prisoner claims innocence of the crime for which he was convicted. 2 0 0 But even accepting the majority's holding that Carrier, and not Sawyer, applied to cases where a petitioner claims innocence of an underlying crime, ChiefJustice Rehnquist still differed from the majority. Specifically disturbing to the Chief Justice was the majority's "more likely than not" articulation of Carrier's "probably resulted" standard. To support his position, Chief Justice Rehnquist characterized the majority's articulation of the Carrier "probably resulted" standard as itself an implicit adoption of the Jackson rationality standard. [Vol. 86
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JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia 1 1 argued that § 2244(b) 21 2 controlled this case.
2 1 3 Justice Scalia pointed out that under § 2244(b), a federal district court "need not... entertai [n] " 214 a state prisoner's second or subsequent petition for the writ of habeas corpus. 2 1 5 Considering this statutory language, Justice Scalia found the majority's opinion-which he viewed as requiring habeas courts to entertain second and successive petitions upon the showing that a "miscarriage of justice" has occurred-to be "flatly contradicted by statute." 2 16 In fact, Justice Scalia argued that Congress specifically acted to make the miscarriage ofjustice exception inapplicable under the circumstances of Schlup's case. As Justice Scalia noted, Congress first addressed the issue of repetitive habeas petitions by adopting legislaton in 1948. 217 Under the terms of that legislation, federal district courts could deny petitions for habeas review only where "the ends of justice w[ould] not be served by such inquiry." 2 1 8 Accordingly, Justice Scalia, though dissenting in this case, found that in Sanders v. United States, 2 19 the Court acted with "unimpeachable logic" when it construed the statute as imposing a "duty" on habeas courts to reach the merits of a subsequent petition "if the ends ofjustice demand." 22 0 Justice Scalia argued, however, that subsequent congressional amendments make the Sanders holding inapplicable here. 2 2 ' As Justice Scalia pointed out, Congress amended § 2244 three years after the Sanders decision. 2 22 Because of these amendments, § 2244(b), which applies to state prisoners, contains no "ends ofjustice" provision.
2 2 3 plurality of the Court announced that it would "continue to rely on the references in Sanders to the 'ends ofjustice."' 225 Nonetheless, Justice Scalia concluded that the miscarriage of justice inquiry is "not required by [Supreme Court] precedent." 226 First, Justice Scalia argued that Kuhlmann, having been decided without a majority, "lacks formal status as authority." 227 Moreover, Justice Scalia construed subsequent majority Court holdings as not imposing a duty on habeas courts to apply the ends of justice exception. 228 Although Justice Scalia acknowledged that some of these cases have restated the "ends of justice" duty recognized in Kuhlmann, 229 he also pointed out that many cases treated this "miscarriage-of-justice doctrine as a rule of permission rather than a rule of obligation." tional claim. If anything, the mere fact that Schlup had separate constitutional claims (independent of his straight-forward actual innocence claim) should have strengthened, not weakened, his habeas petition. 23 9 Indeed, although Lloyd Schlup had constitutional claims other than actual innocence, 2 40 he still had a "personal stake" in the resolution of whether a free-standing constitutional claim of innocence could be a cognizable issue for habeas review. 241 A look at the inherent problems with Schlup's independent constitutional claims demonstrates how the Court's refusal to address actual innocence as a free-standing claim compromised his individual interests in justice.
Because the Supreme Court is unwilling to recognize innocence as a constitutional claim in and of itself, Schlup must necessarily rely on other constitutional claims such as ineffectiveness of trial counsel.
24 2 Yet in determining whether trial counsel has been constitutionally ineffective, a court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within a wide range of professional assist- Although the Court should have addressed the issue of whether actual innocence is itself a constitutional claim, the majority did properly recognize that capital prisoners may use evidence of innocence to open a gateway to habeas court review of independent claims. 26 7 For the purposes of guiding habeas courts confronted with gateway claims of actual innocence, the Schlup Court appropriately articulated the "more likely than not" standard as an alternative to the more stringent Sawyer "clear and convincing" standard. First, the terms of the Sawyer standard indicate that it was intended to apply only to challenges to death sentences, and not to challenges to convictions. 2 68 Sawyer held that to trigger the miscarriage ofjustice exception, a petitioner would need to show "by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty." 269 Because Lloyd Schlup argued that he was actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, 2 70 Sawyer was distinguishable.
There were also compelling reasons for not expanding the Sawyer "clear and convincing" standard to gateway claims of innocence, such as Schlup's, where the petitioner disputes guilt of an underlying crime. Intuitively, someone who may be entirely innocent of a crime (i.e., a prisoner claiming actual innocence of the crime) would seem entitled to a greater degree of protection than would someone who comes to the court with dirty hands (i.e., a prisoner who only challenges the severity of his sentence). Moreover, lowering the barrier to habeas review for prisoners who claim innocence of a crime will only minimally implicate societal interests. As the-majority noted, because evidence of actual innocence of a crime is generally not available to habeas petitioners, 2 71 the "threat to judicial resources, finality, and comity posed by claims of actual innocence is less than that posed by claims relating only to sentencing."272 267 Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 860 (1995 In contrast to the minimal threat that claims of actual innocence of a crime pose to societal interests are the potentially extraordinary benefits to individual death row inmates with substantial evidence of innocence. To be sure, at least some death row inmates who would not have been able to meet the stringent "clear and convincing" standard of Sawyer will now be able to open a gateway to a full habeas hearing. Lloyd Schlup is one of them.
2 73 As a direct result of the majority's less stringent standard, Lloyd Schlup no longer awaits his execution, but instead a full federal court hearing on the merits of his habeas petition. 274 Thus, the qualitative impact of a less exacting standard can be extraordinary to individuals.
75
Given the overriding individual interests that would otherwise be threatened by expansion of the Sawyer "clear and convincing" standard, the majority was correct in holding the less stringent "probably 
The Implications of the Court's "More Likely Than Not" Holding
Despite the potential of the majority's less stringent standard, it is not likely to significantly protect future, actually innocent habeas petitioners. First, Congress has already moved to reverse Schlup, and bring habeas courts back to the "clear and convincing" standard of Sawyer. 281 But regardless of whether Congress and the President agree on legislation that would rekindle Sawyer, the Schlup majority's analysis of the miscarriage ofjustice exception provides actually innocent petitioners with precarious protection because, consistent with Justice Scalia's dissenting arguments, the miscarriage ofjustice exception appears to be a "rule of permission." Under a rule of permission approach, federal habeas courts have permission, but are under no obligation, to grant full habeas hearings where prisoners present evidence of innocence sufficient to trigger the miscarriage ofjustice exception. Thus, although the Schlup majority explicitly recognized the individual interests that actually innocent capital prisoners have in justice, those interests may not receive additional respect under the Court's less stringent gateway standard. That is, habeas courts may simply choose to ignore the miscarriage ofjustice exception even where a state prisoner's new evidence of innocence makes it "more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him." A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless the applicant shows that... the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6 (1966). Certainly, giving habeas courts the free-Section 2244(b) now addresses successive and abusive habeas claims by state prisoners, and contains no reference to an "ends of justice" inquiry. 286 Interestingly enough, § 2244(a), which now addresses claims by federal prisoners, retained the "ends ofjustice" language from the earlier version of the statute. 287 It is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposefully when it includes particular language in one section of a statute, but omits it in another. 288 Thus, it is clear that Congress at least intended the miscarriage ofjustice exception to apply differently as between state and federal prisoners.
Because § 2244(a) contains identical language as the original habeas legislation (except that § 2244(a) now addresses only federal prisoners),289 Supreme Court precedent interpreting the original version should still apply. That is, when addressing habeas petitions of federal prisoners, habeas courts should still have a "duty" to reach the merits of subsequent petitions wherever the ends of justice demand. 29 0 However, the current version of § 2244(b) states that habeas courts "need not entertain" a state prisoner's successive or abusive petition. 29 1 It therefore appears that habeas courts may dismiss such claims, as a matter of discretion, even where denial of'a full habeas hearing would implicate a fundamental miscarriage of justice under the "more likely than not" gateway standard of Schlup.
292
The Schiup majority opinion does not appear to contradict the natural construction of § 2244.293 In fact, prompted by Justice Scalia's dissent, Justice O'Connor made clear in her concurrence that the majority's holding "does not disturb the traditional discretion" afforded habeas courts. 29 4 This result, correct under the terms of § 2244, would of course be void if in defiance of the Constitution. 2 95 As discussed above, however, the clear inference of Schlup is that the Constitution does not prohibit the execution of an innocent person. 296 A law which allows federal judges to deny habeas hearings despite evidence of innocence would therefore appear to be, a fortiori, constitutional.
297
Vi. CONCLUSION Although the Court viewed Lloyd Schlup's second petition for habeas corpus relief as procedurally barred, it held that he could receive a full habeas hearing if his new evidence of innocence makes it "more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him." 298 While this is a correct result, the Court's opinion is not likely to significantly protect innocent people from being executed.
First, the Court failed to recognize key points of distinction between the evidence of innocence that Lloyd Schlup presented, and the evidence of innocence presented in Henera v. Collins. Because Schlup's evidence was much stronger, the Court should not have ruled on'the issue of whether the Constitution bars the execution of a factually innocent person. The implication of the Court's silence is that full habeas hearings are unavailable on straight-forward constitutional claims of actual innocence. Second, the Court's analysis of the fundamental miscarriage ofjustice exception does -not appear to contradict the argument that the exception is a rule of permission. Thus, after Schlup, federal courts will likely be free to dismiss the habeas petitions of state prisoners even where new evidence of innocence makes it "more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted." JAMES G. Ci ssuRAs 294 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Because Justice O'Connor represents the fifth Justice in a five Justice majority, her narrow understanding of the majority opinion becomes the law. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1970) . 295 The Constitution is supreme over ordinary law, and laws in defiance of the Constitution are void. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 296 Schlup v. Delo, 114 S. Ct. 1368 Ct. (1994 . See Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 861 n. 31 (1995) ("we denied certiorari on Schlup's Herrera claim").
297 This is particularly significant now that Congress and the President have acted to severely limit the availability of habeas review through the "Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996." See supra note 281 and accompanying text. These new provisions, which severely limit the availability of habeas review, would likewise appear constitutional. 298 Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 867.
